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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: RECENT TRENDS IN
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
KENNETH

N.

FLAXMAN*

Criminal cases comprise approximately twenty percent of the
docket of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.,
Each year that court decides more than 750 cases, 2 of which about 160
are criminal appeals.3 As in most circuits, 4 criminal appeals result in
reversals less frequently than do civil appeals. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts reports that the Seventh Circuit
reverses 20.5% of all private civil appeals and 10.8% of all criminal appeals. 5
In its 1979-80 term, the Seventh Circuit employed circuit rule 356
to dispose of nearly seventy percent of all criminal appeals and fifty
percent of all civil appeals in "unpublished opinions."' 7 In those decisions which it chose to publish in its 1979-80 term, the Seventh Circuit
continued its broad reading of federal criminal statutes, 8 and moved in
the direction of relying on a police officer's "good faith" as the control*

B.E.E., City University of New York; J.D., lIT/Chicago Kent College of Law.
1. In calendar year 1979, 310 of the 1,598 appeals docketed in the Seventh Circuit, or 19.3%,
were criminal appeals. The JudicialBusiness of the United States Courts of the Seventh Circuit 14
(1979).
2. In the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1979, the Seventh Circuit disposed of 757
appeals after hearing or submission. 1979 Annual Report of the Director,Administrative Office of
the United States Courts A-3.
3. Id. Collateral attacks on criminal convictions totalled 31 for federal prisoners and 42 for
state prisoners. Id. at A-10.
4. The average reversal rate for all circuits in private civil appeals is 18.9%, almost twice the
10.4% reversal rate in criminal appeals. The First Circuit, which reverses in 21.7% of all criminal
appeals (and only 15.9% of all private civil appeals), is the only circuit which reverses more than
twelve percent of its criminal appeals. Id. at A-2.
5. Id. at A-3.
6. 7TH CIR. R. 35 (formerly rule 28) purports to authorize the Seventh Circuit to dispose of
appeals by "unpublished orders," which may not be cited as precedent in any other cases. See
generally Meites & Flaxman, Civil Liberties: Employment Discrimination,Due Process,Immunities
and Exhaustion of Remedies, 56 CHI-KENT L. REV. 73, 73-4 (1980).
7. Although the Seventh Circuit's Annual Report does not differentiate between cases decided by published opinions and unpublished orders, statistics collected by the Clerk of the Seventh Circuit show that from January, 1980 through the end of September, 1980, 417 of the 729
decisions (or 57%) were by unpublished order. This is consistent with a count of the decisions of
the Seventh Circuit which reveals that of the 440 decisions of the Seventh Circuit, 236 (or 53.6%)
were rule 35 unpublished orders. One hundred and seven (or 24.3%) were decisions in criminal
appeals, 72 (or 67.2%) of which were decided by unpublished order. In the same period, 164 of
333 civil appeals (or 49.3%) were decided by unpublished order.
8. See notes 44-158 in/ra and accompanying text.
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ling factor in assessing fourth amendment claims. 9 Other highlights' 0
of the court's 1979-80 term include the creation of a new standard for
review of a district court's post-verdict grant of a judgment of acquittal I and a refusal to fashion standards for compensation of appointed
2
counsel under the Criminal Justice Act.'
REISSUANCE OF "UNPUBLISHED ORDERS" AS PUBLISHED OPINIONS

A virtually invisible highlight of the 1979-80 term is the use of
Seventh Circuit rule 35(d)(3)1 3 by institutional litigants-namely, the
United States Attorney and the Illinois Attorney General' 4-to obtain
reissuance of unpublished orders as published opinions.1 5 The invisibility of this phenomenon is the result of the Seventh Circuit's practice
of refusing to disclose the basis upon which an unpublished order was
reissued as a published order. With few exceptions, 16 the granting of a
motion to publish is shown in the published opinion by a footnote
which states: "This appeal originally was decided by unreported order
on [date of unpublished opinion]. See Circuit Rule 35. The panel has
decided to issue the decision as an opinion."
Cases decided in unpublished orders do not always involve wellsettled principles of law. For example, in United States v. Klein ,' 17 the
court was confronted with the question of whether the rationale of
Terry v. Ohio' 8 was applicable to investigatory detentions of prop9. See notes 159-92 infra and accompanying text.
10. This article does not attempt to analyze each of the criminal law-related cases decided by
the Seventh Circuit in its 1979-80 term.
11. See notes 194-210 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 211-37 infra and accompanying text.
13. 7TH CIR. R. 35(d)(3) authorizes "any person" to request reissuance of an unpublished
order as a published opinion.
14. A Lexis search of Seventh Circuit opinions which had originally been announced as unpublished orders and then reissued as published opinions reveals that of the total of 17 of such
cases from August, 1979 through August, 1980, the United States Attorney had been counsel in 10
of those cases, and the Illinois Attorney General in four. With the exception of United States v.
Hubbard, 618 F.2d 422 (7th Cir. 1980), where the motion to publish was made by the non-party
Prison Law Monitor, the motion to publish in each case involving an institutional litigant appears
to have been made by that party.
15. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the number of cases in which a motion to
publish is denied. Such an inquiry would require the mammoth undertaking of checking the
docket sheet of each appeal decided in an unpublished order, because the Seventh Circuit does not
keep separate statistics of this phenomenon.
16. On rare occasions, the Seventh Circuit discloses that the unpublished order has been
reissued as a published opinion on a motion. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 617 F.2d 455 n.*
(7th Cir. 1979). In even fewer instances will the court disclose the identity of the party who had
requested reissuance of the order as a published opinion. See, e.g., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.
v. F.T.C., 517 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1975).
17. 626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1980).
18. 392 U.S. i (1968).
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erty. 19 The court admitted that its "research ha[d] uncovered no case in
which a court has confronted a detention situation precisely like the
one before us now."' 20 The court, nonetheless, initially announced its
decision upholding the investigatory seizure in an unpublished order.
In its motion to publish, 2' the United States Attorney pointed out that
this decision "establishing a new . . .rule of law" 22 should be published, and for the first time 23 advised the court that three trial courts,
none of which had issued an opinion, had considered the same ques24
tion. Two of the trial courts had upheld the investigatory seizure,
25
while one had found the seizure to have been unlawful.
A review of the criminal cases reissued as published opinions
shows that, in general, the decisions involved questions of law which
were usually resolved favorably to the government. For example, in
United States v. Price,26 the Seventh Circuit had agreed with the government's arguments that "a public official can be guilty of extortion
even if the victim pays for something to which he was not legally entitled."' 27 In its brief, the government had asserted that this principle was
well settled. 28 But in its motion to publish, the government represented
that by accepting this argument, the court had resolved "several con'29
flicts in the law."
The absence of any independent agency to monitor each unpub30
lished order and advise the court if the opinion has precedential value
means that, in general, 3' the bar must rely on institutional litigants to
19. In Klein, two suitcases were seized while a search warrant was obtained; the subsequent
search of the suitcases revealed cocaine. 626 F.2d at 24. Cf United States v. Garza-Hernandez,
623 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1980) (if warrantless seizure of automobile is lawful, warrantless search of
vehicle is also lawful).
20. 626 F.2d at 25.
21. Government's Motion for Publication of the Decision of the Court, United States v.
Klein, 626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1980).
22. Id. at 1. 7TH CIR. R. 35(c)(I)(i) sets out, as one criterion for issuance of a decision as a
published opinion, that the decision has "establish[ed] a new ... rule of law."
23. Initially, on appeal the government did not advise the court that similar investigatory
seizures had been at issue in other cases, but presented in its brief the analogy to United States v.
Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) which was adopted by the Seventh Circuit, 626 F.2d at 25.
24. United States v. Cunningham, No. 78-80070 E.D. Mich. (1978); United States v. Casey,
No. H-78-74 D. Conn. (1978).
25. People v. Valle, Cir. Ct. Cook County, Illinois, No. MC-80-1-756854 (1980).
26. 617 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1980).
27. Brief of the United States at 19, United States v. Price, 617 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1980).
28. Id. at 19-22.
29. Government's Motion for Publication of the Decision of the Court at 2, United States v.
Price, 617 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1980).
30. This was the solution to "library overgrowth" proposed forty years ago by Dean Pound.
See R. POUND, APPELLATE REVIEW IN CIVIL CASES 391 (1941).

31. One exception in the Seventh Circuit's 1979-80 term was a case in which the motion to
publish was filed by the non-party Prison Law Monitor, which represented that it was interested in
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secure the publication of important decisions mistakenly announced as
"unpublished orders." The Seventh Circuit's decision in United States
v. Rodriguez32 makes plain that such reliance is misplaced.
United States v. Rodriguez involved a prosecutor's improper closing argument. 33 In United States v. Spainj 4 the Seventh Circuit had
stated that improper closing arguments by the prosecution were apparent in many criminal cases, 35 and had intimated that continuation of
36
this practice would result in the adoption of aper se rule of reversal.
In United States v. Buege, 37 the Seventh Circuit again cautioned prosecutors to refrain from improper final arguments, reiterating its warning
that continued improper final arguments would result in the adoption
of aper se rule of reversal.3 8 The same threat of adoption of aper se
rule of reversal was made by the Seventh Circuit in its unpublished
39
order in United States v. Pleas Moody.
The decision in Moody falls within the guidelines for disposition
by published opinion of Seventh Circuit rule 35(c)(1)(ii) in that it "involves an issue of continuing public interest" '40 However, the Seventh
Circuit's docket sheet for Moody shows that no person sought publication of the unpublished order, even though, as the court later stated in
United States v. Rodriguez,4' a copy of the unpublished order in Moody
had been forwarded to each United States Attorney, "directing attention to the warning it contained, together with the court's suggestion
that United States Attorneys disseminate copies of the order to all their
42
assistants or circulate their own memoranda on the subject."
The teaching of Rodriguez and Moody is two-fold. First, the
guidelines for disposition by unpublished order of rule 35(c)(1)(i)
notwithstanding, 43 important decisions may be lurking in the unpublished orders of the Seventh Circuit. Second, institutional litigants,
disseminating to its readership the court's unpublished order in that case. See United States v.
Hubbard, 613 F.2d 422 (7th Cir. 1980).
32. 627 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1980).
33. The improper comment referred to the defendant's failure to have testified in his own
behalf. Id. at I1.
34. 536 F.2d 170 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976).
35. Id. at 176.
36. Id.
37. 578 F.2d 187 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 871 (1978).
38. Id. at 189-90.
39. No. 78-1981 (7th Cir. Feb. 27, 1979) (unpublished opinion).
40. 7TH CIR. R. 35(c)(l)(ii) provides "A published opinion will be filed when the decision
• . . involves an issue of continuing public interest."
41. 627 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1980).
42. Id. at 112.
43. 7TH CIR. R. 35(c)(1)(i) provides: "A published opinion will be filed when the decision
. . . establishes a new, or changes an existing rule of law."
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like the United States Attorney, cannot be depended upon to insure
that decisions which were mistakenly issued as unpublished orders are
re-issued as published opinions. This is an area of the court's business
which bears further scrutiny.
EXPANDING FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

In its 1979-80 term, the Seventh Circuit was generally unsympathetic to the claims of convicted defendants that their wrongful acts
could not be punished as violations of federal criminal laws. The common theme in the Seventh Circuit's decisions involving jurisdictional
challenges is that federal criminal statutes should be construed in favor
of punishing wrongdoers. That this view is not always correct is illustrated by the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Peters44 and
45
the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Bifulco v. United States.
At issue in Peters was the question of whether the mandatory special parole term required by section 406 of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 197046 for persons convicted of
the substantive drug offenses under that Act 47 is also applicable to persons convicted of conspiracy to commit those substantive offenses. 48 In
cursory fashion, the Seventh Circuit resolved this question of statutory
49
construction adversely to the defendant.
The Seventh Circuit's rationale in Peters was that "the absence of
any explicit reference to [a special parole term for conspiracy convictions] reflects the integral nature of the term to the sentence imposed."' 50 This reasoning was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court
in Bifulco v. United States,5 1 where the Court held that the absence of
any explicit reference to a special parole term for convictions of conspiracy was intentional, and meant that Congress had not intended to
extend this punishment to persons convicted only of conspiracy
52
charges.
It might well be that the Seventh Circuit's other decisions rejecting
jurisdictional challenges suffer from the same flaw as the Seventh Cir44. 617 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1980).
45. 447 U.S. 381 (1980).
46. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) makes unlawful the manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to distribute of various controlled substances.
48. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B) provides, interalia, for a special parole term of at least 2 years in
addition to any term of imprisonment.
49. 617 F.2d at 505-06.
50. Id. at 505.
51. 447 U.S. 381 (1980).
52. Id. at 2254-58.
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cuit's reasoning in Peters-akin to what Chief Justice Burger characterized in his concurring opinion in B!fulco v. UnitedStates as yielding to
"[tihe temptation to exceed our limited judicial role and do what we
regard as the more sensible thing."'53 Future decisions by the Supreme
Court will determine the correctness of the Seventh Circuit's expansive
view of the Hobbs Act 5 4 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
55
Organizations (RICO) Act.
The Hobbs Act
Prior to 1970, the Hobbs Act 56 had been applied in prosecutions
for extortion involving the "wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear."' 57 The language of the act is much broader, though,
and includes "the obtaining of property from another with his consent
induced. . . under color of official right. ' 58 Starting with UnitedStates
v. Kenny, 59 the courts of appeals have upheld application of the Hobbs
Act to local public officials who had misused their offices, 60 as long as
the misuse of official position somehow affected interstate commerce. 6 1
53. Id. at 401-02 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976), discussed in the text accompanying notes 56-119 infra.
55. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (Supp. III 1979), discussed in the text accompanying notes 120156 infra.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The Hobbs Act was intended to correct the result reached by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Local 807 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521 (1942), where it
held that the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 979, did not apply to extortion which arguably involved a claim for wages. See United States v. Emmons, 410 U.S. 396, 401-08 (1973).
57. See United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875, 877 n.4 (7th Cir. 1974), affdinpart,rev'din
part, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975). See Stern, Prosecutionsof
Local Political Corruption Under The Hobbs Act." The Unnecessary Distinction Between Bribery and
Extortion, 3 SEATON HALL L. REV. 1 (1971).

58. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). Extortion under color of official right had been proscribed in the
predecessor of the Hobbs Act, the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 979. The legislative
history of the 1934 act is devoid of any explanation of what was meant by "extortion under color
of official right." See, e.g., United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639, 644-45 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975). Debates in the House of Representatives, though, indicate that
Congress intended to adopt the New York common law definition of extortion. See United States
v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1073 (8th Cir. 1980).
59. 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Kuta, 518 F.2d 947 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014
(1975); United States v. Irali, 503 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975);
United States v. Gill, 490 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1973).
61. Impact upon interstate commerce has been shown in two ways. First, the extortion may
have resulted in some depletion of resources which the victim would otherwise have used in transactions involving articles which had been in interstate commerce. Second, the money taken may
have been used in such transactions. See, e.g., United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980) (possibility that money taken would have been used in
interstate transactions); United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975) (same); United States v. Irali, 503 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975) (depletion of assets); United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975) (same); United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974) (same).
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The Supreme Court has yet to review the correctness of these decisions.
The present view of the broad scope of the Hobbs Act is illustrated by
three decisions of the Seventh Circuit in its 1979-80 term.
In United States v. Price,62 the Seventh Circuit was concerned with
a former inspector of the Chicago Bureau of Electrical Inspection who
had accepted illegal payments from electrical contractors. 63 On appeal,
the defendant argued that the illegal payments had been obtained as
bribes and not as extortion payments, thereby not coming within the
proscriptions of the Hobbs Act. 64 In rejecting this argument, the Seventh Circuit obliterated the distinction between bribery and extortion
under color of official right which had been suggested in United States
v. Pranno65 and in Judge Campbell's concurring opinion in United
States v. Staszcuk.66
United States v. Pranno involved the payment of money under the
threat that a construction permit for a manufacturing plant would be
withheld. 67 On appeal, the defendants argued that extortion and bribery were mutually exclusive, and that the payment was a bribe and not
the product of extortion. 68 In rejecting this argument, the Seventh Circuit observed that the payment "might be solely a bribe and not extor'69
tion if the record showed that the issuance of the permit was illegal."
Issuance of the permit, though, had been legal, and the question of
whether payments made to secure issuance of an illegal permit consti70
tuted extortion was not reached.
United States v. Staszcuk 7 was the Seventh Circuit's first case involving extortion under "color of official right."'7 2 There, a Chicago
alderman had accepted unlawful payments in exchange for his promise
not to oppose three zoning amendments. 73 In rejecting the defendant's
claims that the payment had not been obtained under color of official
62. 617 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1980).
63. Id. at 456. Price was one of 29 inspectors and supervisors employed by the City of Chicago Bureau of Electrical Inspection who were indicted in October and November of .1978 for
extortion under color of official right. Twenty-five of those indicted were subsequently convicted.
Government's Motion for Publication of the Decision of the Court at 2, supra note 29.
64. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 18-2 1, supra note 27.
65. 385 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1968).
66. 502 F.2d 875, 882-83 (7th Cir. 1974) (Campbell, J., concurring).
67. 385 F.2d at 389.
68. Id. at 390.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974), atdin part,rev'd in part on othergrounds, 517 F.2d 53 (7th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975).
72. Id. at 877.
73. Id. at 878.
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right, the court held that "[t]o accept money in return for an agreement
. . .to suspend independent judgment on the merits of such zoning
changes-constitutes obtaining property from another, with his con74
sent, induced under color of official right."
In a brief concurring opinion joined in by all members of the
panel, 75 Judge Campbell wrote that in order to show extortion under
color of official right, the government "need only demonstrate that the
public official has obtained from the 'victim' something of value to
which the official is not entitled, in return for something that should
have been provided without payment. ' 76 In Judge Campbell's view,
payments made to obtain something to which the payee is not entitled
would not be extortion under color of official right, but would rather be
77
bribery of a public official.
The question of whether there can ever be a distinction between
bribery of a public official and extortion under color of official right
was squarely presented in United States v. Price.78 There, the defendant claimed that he had been bribed by an unlicensed electrical con79
tractor to permit that contractor to work as if he had been licensed.
This, the Seventh Circuit held, was extortion under color of official
right because the defendant had been able to provide the unlawful permits "due to his official position." 80
The sole authority cited by the Seventh Circuit for this holding
was its prior decision in United States v. Braasch .8 The statements in
Staszcuk 8 2 and Pranno83 which were "arguably contrary" were rejected as "dicta and not controlling. ' 84 A closer examination of the
Braasch decision, though, reveals that the language from Braasch relied upon in Price was also dictum.
Braasch involved Chicago police officers who had been receiving
payments from tavern owners to buy "protection" from police harassment. 85 In the words of Justice Clark, 86 "a set of roving police officers
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
617
Id.

at 882 (Campbell, J., concurring).
at 882-83.
at 883.
F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1980).
at 457.

80. Id.

81. 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
82. See notes 71-77 supra and accompanying text.
83. See notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text.
84. 617 F.2d at 457.

85. The prosecution involved "the corruption of the entire vice squad of the 18th Police District of Chicago over a period of many years." 505 F.2d at 141.
86. Justice Tom C. Clark, Associate Justice (Retired) of the United States Supreme Court,
was sitting by designation. 505 F.2d at 141, n.*.
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preyed upon the vulnerable position of the bars in the 18th district for
their own profit."'87 Taverns were harassed in various ways,88 and to
put a "stop [to] this sort of harassment. . . the payment of 'protection'
'8 9
money appeared to be the only answer.
One of the issues before the Seventh Circuit in Braasch was
whether the shakedown scheme constituted extortion under color of official right.90 The defendants argued that extortion under color of official right does not include the acceptance of money by a public official
to refrain from performing acts which he can only perform by virtue of
his office, but is limited to "either the acceptance of money by a public
official to perform an act that he was already under a legal duty to
perform or, alternatively, the taking of money under a claim by the
officer that he had an official right to the money by virtue of his office." 9'
In rejecting this argument, the Seventh Circuit relied upon the fact
that the payments had been received through exploitation of the defendants' position as police officers and the exercise of the power of
their office to harass taverns. 9 2 Prior to reaching this conclusion, the
Seventh Circuit used broad language to describe the reach of extortion
under color of official right: "So long as the motivation for the payment focuses on the recipient's office, the conduct falls within the ambit
of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. That such conduct may also constitute 'classic
bribery' is not a relevant consideration. ' 93 It was this broad language
which the Seventh Circuit relied upon in Price when it obliterated any
94
distinction between bribery and extortion.
The Seventh Circuit's broad language in Braasch must be read in
the context of the facts there at issue. Braasch did not involve any
claim that police officers had been paid off to allow unlicensed tavern

87. Id. at 151.
88. The defendants "harassed bars, taverns and liquor establishments through their official
position by making unusually frequent premise checks (four times a day) and identification examinations of patrons; they inspected bars catering to homosexuals with flashlights and harassed the
patrons; they individually 'shook down' proprietors often; they set-up underaged drinkers in bars
in order to frame a violation of law; and they sent liquor licensing authorities false reports about
bars resulting in cancellations." Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 150.
91. Id. at 150-51.
92. Id. at 151.
93. Id. The court here pointed out in a footnote that the modern trend in the federal courts is
to hold that bribery and extortion are not mutually exclusive for the purposes of the Hobbs Act.
Id. at n.7.
94. 617 F.2d at 457.
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owners to operate taverns; on the contrary, Braasch involved payments
made to buy protection from police harassment. Another relevant factor in construing the broad language of Braasch is the approving reference in that case to the discussion of extortion under color of official
right in United States v. Staszcuk, where all members of the panel
agreed with Judge Campbell's view of extortion under color of official
right. 9 5 Thus, the Seventh Circuit's obliteration of any distinction between bribery and extortion under color of official right appears to be
the result of choosing the dicta in Braasch over the dicta in Staszcuk
and Pranno.
Another example of the broad reach of the Hobbs Act is United
States v. Blakey, 96 where two Chicago police officers had shaken down
a heroin dealer who was also in the business of selling automobile
tires. 97 The retail tire business accounted for only a small fraction of
the drug dealer's gross income, 98 but this was held sufficient to establish
that the shakedown had had an impact upon interstate commerce. 99
The outer limits of the type of activity which affects interstate commerce under the Hobbs Act may well have been reached in United
States v. Glynn ,'o another case involving payoffs to Chicago electrical
inspectors. There, the money actually paid to the inspector had been
provided by the FBI,' 0 ' and the payoffs neither depleted the contractor's assets 0 2 nor made it unnecessary for the contractor to purchase
interstate goods for a particular job. 0 3 A direct impact upon interstate
commerce was deemed immaterial by the Seventh Circuit, whichover the dissent of Judge Swygert-held that an attempt to affect commerce is sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of the
95. See notes 71-77 supra and accompanying text.
96. 607 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1979).
97. Id. at 781.
98. For the purposes of its decision, the court apparently accepted defendants' estimate that
less than one percent of the drug dealer's income was derived from his legitimate tire business. Id.
at 783 n.7.
99. Id. at 782-84.
100. 627 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980).
101. Id. at 40. This was a change from the FBI's prior practice of actually creating an ongoing
business to engage in interstate commerce. See United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979).
102. 627 F.2d at 43 (Swygert, J., dissenting). This "depletion of assets" theory was relied
upon in United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1979), discussed in the text at notes 96-99
supra.
103. 627 F.2d at 43 (Swygen, J., dissenting). See, e.g., United States v. Irali, 503 F.2d 1295
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 490 (1975) (interstate commerce affected by evidence that
extorted payments impeded ability of victim to purchase supplies which had been in interstate
commerce).
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Hobbs Act. 10 4 This is a substantial development in the law.
In its en banc decision in United States v. Staszcuk, 105 a majority
of the Seventh Circuit held that some connection with interstate commerce must be proved in each Hobbs Act prosecution,' 06 and that "jurisdiction in the particular case is satisfied by showing a realistic
probability that an extortionate transaction will have some effect on
interstate commerce."' 1 7 Under the facts presented in Staszcuk, the
"realistic probability" of an impact upon interstate commerce was established by evidence that the extortion was likely to have resulted in
the construction of a building using out-of-state components. 108 The
defendant's claim that, after the money had been extorted, plans were
changed, and the building was not constructed, 0 9 was deemed to be a
"fortuitious circumstance[s]" which would not defeat federal jurisdiction.' 10
Under the Staszcuk test, it is far from clear how the government
would be able to prove that the extortion of money supplied by the
FBI, as in Glynn,"' had a "realistic probability" of affecting interstate
commerce. The panel majority in Glynn, though, viewed this problem
as insubstantial, noting that "[elvery court which has considered the
issue has held that an indictment charging an attempt to affect commerce by extortion is proper.""l 2 An examination of the cases cited in
support of this proposition, though, reveals only one district court decision involving an attempt to affect commerce.' 13 The other cases cited
by the Seventh Circuit in G/ynn each involve "attempted extortion
which would, if the act were completed, have [had] the effect of obstructing commerce."' '1 4 This is simply not true for the extortion of
104. The Hobbs Act only punishes "[w~hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or
affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires to do so ...." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
105. 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc), modifying 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974).
106. Id. at 59 n.16.
107. Id. at 60.
108. Id. The extortion involved the payment of $3,000 to a Chicago alderman, in exchange
for his cooperation in obtaining a zoning variance. The rezoning was sought to construct an
animal hospital, which would have required the use of components manufactured outside of Illinois. After the zoning change had been obtained, however, plans to build the animal hospital
were abandoned. Id. at 56.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 60,
111. 627 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980).
112. Id. at 42 n.2.
113. United States v. Brooklier, 459 F. Supp. 476 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
114. United States v. Rosa, 560 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 862
(1977). There, a contractor had refused to make extortion payments. There was no dispute that
the extortion, if completed, would have affected interstate commerce. The defendants argued that
the Hobbs Act "does not by its terms reach merely an attempted extortion." The Third Circuit
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money supplied by the FBI.
The Seventh Circuit's decisions in United States v. Price,, 5 United
States v. Blakey,'" 6 and United States v. G/ynn 17 continue the court's
broad reading of the statutory language of the Hobbs Act. The question of whether the court has yielded to "[tihe temptation to exceed [its]
limited judicial role and do what [it] regard[s] as the more sensible
thing" 1 8 must await future decisions of the Supreme Court." 19
RICO
Another powerful weapon for federal prosecutors is the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.' 20 The act provides civil 12
and criminal 22 penalties for persons who engage in a "pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt."'' 23 A "pattern of racketeering activity" can consist of two robberies punishable under state
24
law by imprisonment for more than one year.'
The RICO Act is the result of congressional concern with infiltrarejected this argument, holding that the Hobbs Act extends to "an attempt to commit extortion in
order to obstruct commerce." Id. at 153.
The other case cited by the Seventh Circuit in Glynn similarly involved an attempt to commit
extortion, rather than attempt to affect interstate commerce. For example, in United States v.
Green, 246 F.2d 155 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1957), the defendants had attempted to
obtain from two employers money in the form of wages to be paid for imposed, unwanted, superfluous and fictitous services of laborers. This money would have been paid from a contract for the
construction of a flood control project which related to "certain navigational difficulties in the
Mississippi River." Id. at 158. There, as the court held, "it is obvious" that the attempted extortion, if completed, would have affected interstate commerce. Id. at 161.
115. 617 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 62-95 supra.
116. 607 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 96-99 supra.
117. 627 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980). See text accompanying notes 100-14 supra.
118. Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 401-02 (1980) (Burger. C.J., concurring).
119. The Supreme Court's most recent decision construing the Hobbs Act, United States v.
Culbert, 435 U.S. 371 (1978), held that proof of "racketeering" is not required by the Act, and
observed that the Act is to be construed as "mak[ing] criminal all conduct within the reach of the
statutory language." Id. at 380.
120. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. 1111979) [hereinafter referred to in text and footnotes as the RICO Act].
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 vests district courts with jurisdiction to enter divestiture orders and
prohibitory injunctions, and to order dissolution or reorganization of enterprises, at the behest of
the Attorney General. The statute also creates a private right of action for treble damages and
attorney's fees in favor of "[a]ny person injured in his business or property" by any of the activities prohibited by the Act. Id. § 1964(c).
122. In addition to fine of not more than $25,000 or imprisonment of not more than twenty
years, 18 U.S.C. § 1963 authorizes forfeiture of property acquired through a violation of the act.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) defines a "pattern of racketeering activity" as "at least two acts of
racketeering activity within ten years." "Racketeering activity" is defined in section 1961(1), and
can consist of "any act or threat involving ...

robbery . . . which is chargeable under State law

and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year."
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tion of commercial entities by organized crime. 125 The language chosen by Congress, however, is significantly broader, as shown by the
126
United
Seventh Circuit's decisions in United States v. Grzywacz,'
27 and United States v. McNary. 128
Aleman,
v.
States
Section 1962(c) of the RICO Act 129 makes it unlawful for a person
employed by any "enterprise" which affects interstate commerce to be
involved "in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity."' 130 On a first reading, this statute would appear to focus upon persons who infiltrate or manage "enterprises"
through "racketeering activity." However, in United States v.
Grzywacz, 13 1 a divided panel of the Seventh Circuit applied section
1962(b) to members of the Madison, Illinois, police department who
32
had accepted bribes and sexual favors from businesses.1
The principal issue in Grzywacz 133 was whether the "enterprises"
covered by RICO 134 included public entities, such as the Madison, Illinois, police department. 135 Over the dissent of Judge Swygert, 136 the
panel held that a police department is an "enterprise" within the meaning of section 1961(4). 137 Similar reasoning was applied in United
States P. Aleman, 13 8 again over the dissent of Judge Swygert. 139 In
125. See Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the Courts. An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L.
REV. 837, 840 (1980).
126. 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980).
127. 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
128. 620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
130. Id.
131. 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980).
132. At trial, the government established that the defendants had "engaged in a pattern of
securing monetary payments and sexual favors from city tavern and tow company operators and
employees in return for 'protection' of certain illegal activities by the businesses." Id. at 684-85.
133. Also at issue in Grzvwacz was the correctness of the trial court's decision to allow the
prosecution to use evidence of prior misconduct by one of the defendants. Id. at 687. The panel
majority upheld the decision of the trial judge, finding that the evidence was highly probative as to
one defendant, and that limiting instructions had been sufficient to prevent "undue prejudice" to
the two other defendants. Id. at 688. Judge Swygert disagreed with this reasoning. Id. at 692-94
(dissenting opinion).
134. The RICO Act defines an "enterprise" to include "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity. and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). Furthermore, the RICO Act makes it unlawful
for any person "to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." Id. § 1962(c).
135. 603 F.2d at 685.
136. Id. at 690-92.
137. The panel majority concluded that public entities were included within the RICO Act
because "Congress intended to frame a widely encompassing enactment to protect both the public
and private sectors from the pervasive influence of racketeering." Id. at 687. Judge Swygert disagreed. finding "nothing in the legislative history [that] indicates that Congress intended governmental units to be included [within RICO]." Id. at 692.
138. 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
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Aleman, the "enterprise" was the "home robbery business."'' 40 The defendants had conducted their "enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering activities-home robberies-and this was held sufficient to
satisfy the RICO Act.' 4 1 United States v. McNary 142 involved the forfeiture provisions of the RICO Act, 143 and held that an otherwise lawful business is subject to forefeiture upon a showing of the "indirect
' 44
investment of the proceeds of racketeering activity."'
The Seventh Circuit's decisions in Grzywacz, Aleman, and McNary are consistent with the majority view that the RICO Act is to be
14 5
liberally construed in favor of punishing wrongdoers. The Third,
Fourth 46 and Fifth 14 7 Circuits have explicitly held, as did the Seventh
Circuit in Grzywacz, that the "enterprise" contemplated by the RICO
Act includes public entities. The only decision to the contrary is that of
the district court in United States v. Mandel, 48 a view which was disapproved by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Baker. 14 9 The Second,' 50 Fifth, 151 Sixth 152 and Ninth 153 Circuits have held, as did the
Seventh Circuit in Aleman, that the "enterprise" contemplated by the
RICO Act need not exist separately from the racketeering activity, i.e.,
the "enterprise" may be the "home robbery business." 154 Views to the
contrary have been expressed by the First' 55 and Eighth 56 Circuits.
Sheer weight of numbers, of course, does not insure the correctness of
decisions, and it might well be that the Supreme Court, whenever it
elects to resolve these conflicts, will, as it did in Bifulco v. United
States, 157 adopt what is now the minority view when it decides Turkette
139. ld. at 311-12 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 304.
141. Id. at 304-05.
142. 620 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980).
143. See note 122 supra.
144. 620 F.2d at 628.
145. United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072
(1978).
146. United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1980).
147. United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
148. 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976).
149. 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980).
150. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
151. United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
152. United States v. Sutton, Nos. 78-5134-39, 78-5141-43 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1980) (en banc),
rev'g, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979).
153. United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
154. See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304 (7th Cir. 1979).
155. United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3531
(1980).
156, United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
157. 447 U.S. 381 (1980). At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Bifu/co, only the
Third Circuit had held that the special parole provisions applicable to convictions of certain sub-
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v. United States.'

8

FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES

In recent years, decisions of the Supreme Court involving fourth
amendment issues have narrowed the applicability of the exclusionary
rule, 59 and placed an increased emphasis upon the warrant clause of
the fourth amendment 60 to protect against unlawful searches and
seizures.' 6 1 The trend discernible from the 1979-80 decisions of the
Seventh Circuit is somewhat different, and is in the direction of upholding searches and seizures whenever the law enforcement agents act
62
in "good faith."
The Seventh Circuit's reliance upon the "good faith" of law enforcement officials is exemplified by the court's decision in United
States v. Berkwitt.163 At issue in Berkwitt was the warrantless search
and seizure of the contents of a van, which had been under surveillance
by agents for approximately eight hours prior to the search and
seizure.' 64 On appeal, the defendants argued that a warrant should
have been obtained prior to the search, 65 and contended that probable
cause for a warrant had existed at 10:00 a.m. or at 4:30 p.m., sufficiently
in advance of the 7:00 p.m. search to have allowed issuance of a warrant. 166 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, finding that probable cause had not come into being until the agents had observed a
67
"flurry of activity" five minutes before the search.'
stantive drug offenses did not apply to convictions of conspiracy to commit those offenses. United
States v. Mearns, 599 F.2d 1296 (3d Cir. 1978).
158. See note 155 supra.
159. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1980) (overruling "automatic standing" of Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (exclusionary rule should be invoked with much greater reluctance where the claim is based on causal
relationships between constitutional violation and discovery of a live witness than when a similar
claim is advanced to support suppression of an inanimate object); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976) (fourth amendment claims not cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings as long as
the prisoner had a "full and fair opportunity" to raise and have adjudicated the claim in state
court).
160. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides, in pertinent part:
[Nbo Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and persons or things to be seized.
161. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); .United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1 (1977).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), rev'g, 594
F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1979).
163. 619 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1980).
164. Id. at 651-52.
165. Id. at 653.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 654.
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In upholding the legality of the warrantless search, the Seventh
Circuit relied upon the fact that the agents had inquired about issuance
of a warrant at 6:30 p.m., prior to the "flurry of activity" which gave
rise to probable cause. 168 The problem with the court's reliance upon
"pre-flurry" attempts to obtain a warrant is that at the time the warrant
was requested, the agents did not have probable cause to search, so any
application for a warrant then should have been rejected. 169 Reliance
upon attempts to obtain a warrant before one should have been issued
can only be relevant to the "good faith" of the agents, rather than to the
reasonableness of the search.
Another example of the Seventh Circuit's growing reliance upon
0
"good faith" is United States v. White, 17
a case involving the warrantless search of a locked attacht case seized from the defendant's car at
the time of his arrest. Absent exigent circumstances, a warrant would
have been necessary for this search, 17 but by relying on the officer's
"good faith" the Seventh Circuit was able to find a sufficient exi72
gency. 1
In explaining why they had acted without a warrant to search the
defendant's locked briefcase, the agents in White claimed that immediately prior to stopping White, they had observed him "lean toward the

right seat and make a gesture toward the flap of his coat."''

73

This ob-

servation, coupled with the fact that when stopped the defendant was

wearing an empty shoulder holster,

74

suggested that the defendant

had removed a gun from his holster and either placed it in the locked
attachd case or thrown it from his car.' 75 In the view of the Seventh
Circuit, the possibility that the gun had been thrown out of the car
created a sufficient exigency to justify the warrantless search of the
76
locked attachd case.'
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 652.
Id.
607 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1979).
See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I

(1977).
172. In United States v. Jimenez, 626 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980), the court was confronted with a

warrantless search of a paper bag found in the trunk of an automobile, and held that the expectation of
173.
174.
175.
176.

privacy which attaches to a locked suitcase does not extend to a paper bag.
607 F.2d at 206.
Id. at 205.
ld. at 208.
The Seventh Circuit concluded as follows:

The agents had the right and duty to avert possible danger to themselves and the
public by finding and holding the gun. The most expeditious way to go about finding it
was to search the limited area of the automobile before expanding the search to other
areas. It would have been unreasonable to require the agents to search the entire termi-

CRIMINAL L4WAND PROCEDURE

The Seventh Circuit's reasoning in White is hard to defend absent
any evidence that one of the arresting officers had observed White appear to throw the gun out of the car window. The only factual support
for this possibility referred to by the court was the testimony of one of
the arresting officers that prior to searching the attachd case he had told
another agent that "I think [White] threw it [the gun] out the window."' 77 Such an unsupported hunch would not be the basis for probable cause, 78 and should not be sufficient to establish exigent
circumstances to avoid the need for a search warrant. The fact that the
agent had communicated his suspicion to another agent, though, provides some support for his good faith in acting on that hunch, and this
is the apparent underpinning of the Seventh Circuit's decision.
Another example of reliance upon the arresting officer's good faith
is Judge Bauer's opinion in United States v. Garcia,179 a case involving
the warrantless search of a suitcase seized during an arrest.' 80 The general rule for such a search is that a warrant is required when the police
"without endangering themselves or risking loss of the evidence, lawfully have detained one suspected of criminal activity and secured his
82
suitcase."' 8' As Judge Swygert pointed out in his dissenting opinion,'
these conditions were met in Garcia, where the defendant had been
83
arrested and her hand luggage seized by the arresting officers.1
In addition to deeming the search to have been incident to the
arrest' 84-the basis for Judge Sprecher's three sentence concurring
opinion' 85-Judge Bauer was of the opinion that a warrant was not
nal area prior to searching the briefcase in order to find the missing revolver. The need
to locate and take possession of a dangerous instrumentality was an exigent circumstance
which justified the warrantless search. The motion to suppress was properly denied.
607 F.2d at 208 (citation omitted).
177. Id. at 208 n.5.
178. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Court noted that where the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the search would not satisfy a "man of reasonable caution" that the search was necessary, the search would be based on nothing more than "inarticulate
hunches" and would amount to a constitutional violation. Id. at 22.
179. 605 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980).
180. Upon being placed under arrest, the defendant dropped the two suitcases she was carrying, became hysterical, and urinated on her clothing. The arresting officers escorted her out of the
flow of pedestrian traffic, and moved her suitcases "to within one foot of her new position." Id.
181. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979).
182. 605 F.2d at 360-68 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 368.
184. Id. at 357-58.
185. Id. at 360. Judge Sprecher's concurrence appears to have been written in response to
Judge Swygert's dissenting opinion. It is difficult, however, to understand how the suitcases were
in the defendant's "immediate control"-the sine qua non of a search incident to an arrest, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763 n. I I (1979)-when the defendant had already been arrested, and
custody of the suitcases had been assumed by the arresting officers.
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required if the arresting officers had acted in a manner which they
deemed to be reasonable. 8 6 In Judge Bauer's view, the question of the
existence vel non of exigent circumstances depends upon the police officer's "subjective analysis of the situation confronting him."'' 87 As
Judge Swygert pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the view that the
existence of exigent circumstances "is to be determined by the 'subjective' assessment of the official on the scene," if adopted, would mean
that it would be "difficult to imagine any arrest situation in which the
warrant requirement would be operative." 88
Taken together, the Seventh Circuit's decisions in United States v.
Berkwitt, 189 United States v. White' 90 and United States v. Garcia'9'
suggest that the court is moving in the direction taken by a majority of
the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Williams, 192 to distill from decisions of the Supreme Court the principle that a law enforcement official
who acts in "good faith" has acted "reasonably" within the proscriptions of the fourth amendment. 93 Such a result would be contrary to
the emphasis placed by the Supreme Court upon the warrant clause of
the fourth amendment, and it remains to be seen if the "good faith"
approach to the fourth amendment will be adopted by the Supreme
Court.
DE Novo REVIEW OF POST-VERDICT JUDGMENTS OF ACQUITTAL

The current view of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment 194 allows the government to appeal from a post-verdict grant of a
judgment of acquittal. 195 In United States v. Beck, 196 the Seventh Cir186. Id. at 356.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 368 (Swygert, J.,
dissenting).
189. See text accompanying notes 161-67 supra.
190. See text accompanying notes 168-76 supra.
191. See text accompanying notes 177-86 supra.
192. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), rev'g, 594 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1979).
193. Under the "good faith" approach, the court will have little sympathy for a search conducted pursuant to a warrant which had been issued upon a perjured affidavit. See United States
v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980).
194. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part:
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of Life
or Limb ...
195. Little more than ten years ago, an authoritative treatise was able to state as black-letter
law the proposition that an appeal by the government from the grant of a post-verdict motion for
judgment of acquittal would constitute double jeopardy. 2 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CRIM, § 469, at 264 & n.2 (1969). Starting with United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), however, the Supreme Court has reassessed the scope of the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I (1978);
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
196. 615 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1980).
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cuit held that the "standard for appellate review of a trial court postverdict judgment of acquittal is the same as that applied by the trial
court."' 197 The court's explicit adoption of this standard of review is a
substantial development in the law.
In ruling on a motion for a judgment of acquittal, the district court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,
and determine if there is sufficient evidence for the jury to have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.19 8 This determination
can be characterized as a mixed question of law and fact because it
involves "the application of a legal standard to a particular set of
facts."' 199 In general, appellate review of determinations of mixed questions of law and fact starts with assessing the correctness of the legal
standard applied by the district court. 200 If the correct legal standard
has been applied, the district court's conclusion is reviewed under the
"clearly erroneous" standard applicable to findings of fact. 20 If the
incorrect legal standard was applied, the reviewing court may apply the
proper standard to the facts as found by the district court, unless those
20 2
facts are rejected as clearly erroneous.
In its prior decisions reviewing post-verdict grants of judgments of
acquittals, the Seventh Circuit applied the ordinary standards of review
applicable to determinations of mixed questions of law and fact. Thus,
in United States v. Allison,203 the Seventh Circuit reversed a post-verdict grant of a judgment of acquittal only after it had disapproved the
district court's view of the elements of the offense which the government was required to establish. 20 4
Similarly, in United States v.
Biasco,20 5 the Seventh Circuit held that the district court had applied
an improper legal standard in granting the post-verdict judgment of
20 6
acquittal.
In United States v. Beck, 20 7 however, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the district judge had "applied the proper standard and
197. Id. at 447.
198. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
199. Cf.TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 194 n.9 (1963); United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394 (1948).
201. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977).
202. Id. at 417-18. See, e.g., United States ex rel Wilson v. Warden, 600 F.2d 66, 69 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019 (1980) (district court's findings that error was not harmless reversed as "clearly erroneous").
203. 555 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1977).
204. Id at 1388.
205. 581 F.2d 681 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978).
206. Id. at 684.
207. 615 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1980).
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based his decision on proper grounds." 20 8 Under ordinary standards of
appellate review, this conclusion should have resolved the appeal in the
defendant's favor, unless the court was able to reject the district court's
findings as clearly erroneous. But under the Seventh Circuit's de novo
standard of review, the findings of the district court were irrelevant,
and the judgment of acquittal was reversed merely because the judges
of the Seventh Circuit, had they been sitting as the district court,
20 9
would have reached a different result.
It is far from clear that the appropriate standard of review of a
post-verdict grant of a judgment of acquittal is review de novo. It is
only recently that appeals by the government from judgments of acquittal have been deemed permissible under the double jeopardy
clause. 21 0 Future developments may well reject the de novo standard of
review adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Beck.
FEES OF APPOINTED COUNSEL UNDER THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT:

A

REFUSAL TO SET STANDARDS

Judges asked to approve compensation for counsel appointed
under the Criminal Justice Act 21 have few standards to guide the exercise of their discretion. 21 2 In its 1979-80 term, the Seventh Circuit re21 3
jected two opportunities to fill this void.
The Criminal Justice Act was intended "to concretize the constitutional pledge of an adequate defense irrespective of economic status." 2 14 As originally enacted, 21 5 the CJA authorized compensation at
maximum hourly rates of fifteen dollars per hour for time spent in
court and ten dollars per hour for time reasonably expended out of
court. 2 16 The ceiling originally set was five hundred dollars for felony
cases and three hundred dollars for misdemeanor cases. 2 17 Upon a
finding by the trial judge of "extraordinary circumstances" requiring
payment in excess of the ceiling "to provide fair compensation for pro208. Id. at 448.
209. Cf. Zenith Radio Corp v. Hazeltine Research Corp., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969) (function of
the court of appeals is not to decide factual issues de novo).
210. See note 193 supra.
211. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976 & Supp. 11

1979) [hereinafter referred to in text as the CJA].

212. See text accompanying notes 224-237 infra.
213. See United States v. D'Andrea, 612 F.2d 1386 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Smith, 633
F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1980).

214. United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 984, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
215. Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (1964) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976 &
Supp. 1II 1979)).

216.

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1) (1976).

217. Id.
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tracted representation," payment in excess of the statutory ceiling could
be made, upon approval by the chief judge of the circuit. 21 8 No provision was made in the original act for payment in excess of the statutory
ceiling for appellate representation.
The 1970 amendments to the CJA were intended, in part, to render
"the maximum rates of compensation payable to appointed counsel
more realistic in terms of today's conditions. ' 21 9 The amendments increased the maximum hourly rates to thirty dollars per hour for court
time, and twenty dollars per hour for out of court time, 22 0 and raised
the statutory ceiling to one thousand dollars for a felony case in the
district court, and to four hundred dollars for a misdemeanor. 22' The
ceiling for appeals in both felony and misdemeanor cases was set at one
thousand dollars. 222 Compensation in excess of the statutory ceiling
continued to require the approval of the chief judge of the circuit upon
a finding by the court before which the services had been rendered that
the case had been "extended or complex" and that compensation in
excess of the statutory ceiling "is necessary to provide fair compensa223
tion."
Neither the original 1964 Act nor the 1970 amendments provides
any further standards for determining "fair compensation" or for determining when compensation in excess of the statutory ceiling is appropriate. In United States v. D '4ndrea224 and United States v. Smith,225
the Seventh Circuit had an opportunity to articulate standards, but declined to do so.
United States v. D'Andrea arose from suggestions for en banc reconsideration of orders reducing the amount of fees requested by two
court appointed attorneys. 226 One attorney had requested $6,859.23,
but only $3,710.12 had been approved by a circuit judge, of which only
$2,213.70 was authorized by the chief judge. 22 7 -The other court appointed attorney in the case had requested $7,142.73; $2,213.70 was approved by a circuit judge, the entirety of which was authorized by the
218. Id.
219. H.R. REP. No. 1546, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. I, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3982, 3983.
220. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(I) (1976).
221. Id. § 3006A(d)(2).
222. Id.
223.
224.
225.

Id. § 3006A(d)(3).
612 F.2d 1386 (7th Cir. 1980).
633 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1980).

226. 612 F.2d at 1387.
227. Id.
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chief judge.22 8
In resolving the requests of the court-appointed attorneys for reconsideration of the fee awards, the Seventh Circuit had an opportunity to explain its decision to reduce the amounts which had been
sought. This, however, the court refused to do. After carefully explaining its resolution of the obscure jurisdictional issues, 2 2 9 the court concluded that while it could not sit en banc to reconsider an order of the
chief judge refusing to approve the full amount certified by a circuit
judge, the court could reconsider its fee determination when the full
amount approved by a circuit judge had in turn been approved by the
chief judge.2 30 It was at this point in its decision that the court could
have explained the basis for its decision to reduce the amount claimed
by the attorney. The court, however, resolved this issue in conclusory
fashion, stating only that it "considers its certification adequate in
23
amount." '
Another opportunity to articulate standards for compensation of
court-appointed counsel was rejected by the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Smith ,232 which consolidated appeals of three cases seeking
review of district court orders refusing to authorize fees in excess of the
statutory ceiling of the Criminal Justice Act. 2 33 As in D"Andrea,2 34 the

Seventh Circuit carefully explained its resolution of the jurisdictional
issues, finding that Criminal Justice Act fee determinations by a district
judge are not reviewable by appeal. 235 The court, however, could have
gone one step further and established guidelines for the district court,
but declined to do so.236
A comprehensive analysis of practices in implementation of the
CJA prior to the 1970 amendments concluded that the standards for
setting fees "varied dramatically from district to district, and indeed
from judge to judge within single districts." 237 The continued absence
of standards means that this problem continues.
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230. Id.
231. Id. at 1389.
232. 633 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1980).
233. One appellant, appointed to represent a defendant in two felony cases, requested
$3,901.16 in one case and $2,263.00 in the other. In each case $1,000.00 was approved. The second appellant requested fees of $3,050.67, and was granted $1,000.00. The third appellant requested fees of $1,444.00, and $250.00 was approved.
234. See text accompanying note 229 supra.
235. 633 F.2d at 741-42.
236. Id.
237. United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 984, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1978), discussing SUBCOMM. ON
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91st Cong., Ist Sess., (Comm. Print 1969) (Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States by Prof. Dallin Oaks).
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CONCLUSION

The most disturbing trend in the Seventh Circuit's decisions in
criminal law-related cases is the court's inappropriate use of unpublished orders. While the virtual invisibility of this practice renders it
effectively immune from review by the Supreme Court, it is worthy of
greater scrutiny from the practicing bar.
In those of its decisions which it chose to publish-either sua
sponte or on motion-the Seventh Circuit continued its broad reading
of federal criminal statutes, and moved in the direction of relying on
the "good faith" of a law enforcement official in applying the exclusionary rule for fourth amendment violations. Future decisions of the
court will establish whether these observations represent actual trends
or merely the myopic conclusions of a humble reviewer.
The Seventh Circuit's creation of a new standard of review of a
district court's post-verdict grant of a judgment of acquittal, and the
court's refusal to fashion standards for compensation of appointed
counsel under the Criminal Justice Act, though, are unmistakable developments in the law worthy of renewed challenge.

